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On Monday, March 17, 2003, President George W. Bush addressed the nation to announce that 
a U.S. attack on Iraq was imminent. The following week, as American troops raced toward 
Baghdad and the eventual toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime, the results of a Gallup Poll 
conducted on March 22 and 23 indicated that Bush's job approval had increased from 58 percent 
in the days prior to his address to 71 percent following the invasion. Over the months that 
followed, as U.S. occupation forces struggled to put down a violent anti-American insurgency, 
Bush's job approval numbers bottomed out at 50 percent in mid-November, only to surge back to 
63 percent following the capture of Saddam Hussein in mid-December. Today, with the 2004 
general election approaching, the economic recover anemic, and President Bush's job approval 
numbers hovering once again around the 50 percent level, speculation is widespread as to 
whether a major military offensive along the Afghan-Pakistan border might capture al Qaeda 
leader Osama bin Laden in time to boost the president's approval ratings and cement the 
president's reelection. 
In the 1998 film Wag the Dog, a fictional president manufactures a military conflict with a minor 
foreign country as a means of diverting public attention from a sex scandal. While it is unlikely 
that the attack on Iraq and the capture of Saddam Hussein were designed to bolster the 
president's popularity or to divert attention from a lackluster economic recovery, the prospect 
nevertheless is not beyond the realm of possibilities. While the notion that a president might 
provoke a crisis solely for political gain suggests a disturbingly cynical political calculus, the 
assumption that he might do so appears to be fairly widespread among the American electorate if 
films such as Wag the Dog are any indication. If such is the case however, it is reasonable to 
assume that there is evidence for this phenomenon beyond the anecdotal.  
Few aspects of political behavior and interaction have elicited as much attention and study as has 
war, and the conditions surrounding presidential exercises of this authority have engendered 
considerable debate as well. While concern over the nature and scope of the presidential war 
power is as old as the republic itself—"[t]he constitution supposes, what the History of all Govts 
demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power most interested in war, & most prone to it," 
James Madison wrote Thomas Jefferson in April 1798[1]—it is only in recent decades that 
quantitative and analytical assessments of the circumstances surrounding presidential uses of 
force have been attempted. For the most part, these studies have fallen into two general 
categories: those addressing the circumstances surrounding and perhaps contributing to such 
decisions, and those focusing on the political and electoral ramifications of such decisions on the 
president and his party. 
Public approval has become the coin of the realm for the modern presidency—presidents with 
broad support are more successful in pushing their legislation through Congress, in avoiding 
having their vetoes overridden, and in securing reelection for both themselves and members of 
their party. Anecdotal and some empirical evidence suggests that one of the most effective and 
simplest means of bolstering one's public approval is through uses of force, which are routinely 
accorded considerable television coverage and serve to spotlight the president's diplomatic and 
military expertise, not to mention his resoluteness as a leader. Given the disparities between past 
and more recent research into the "Rally 'Round the Flag" effect, as well as the serious ethical 
and political considerations raised by the issue, further research into the phenomenon is 
warranted. 
Why is it that some presidential uses of force seem to boost the popularity of the chief executive, 
while others seem to go unnoticed by the electorate? Are presidents prone to making such 
decisions as a means toward diverting public attention from poor economic conditions, bolstering 
their public approval ratings, or influencing impending elections? In order to refine present theory 
and understanding of the diversionary theory of war and presidential uses of force, this research 
will reexamine the rally effect, employing a data set never before incorporated into past research 
on the phenomenon—the Correlates of War Project's Militarized Interstate Disputes data set, 
encompassing all militarized interstate disputes occurring between 1814 and 1992—and 
extending the analysis to include ten presidential administrations, the Roosevelt through the Bush 
presidencies.  
Presidential Approval 
The importance of public approval and support to presidential success is well documented. Both 
Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde [2] and Fiorina [3] note that voting behavior in presidential and 
congressional elections is influenced by the popularity of the White House incumbent, while 
Marra and Ostrom [4] demonstrate that the president's public approval ratings play a role in the 
distribution of congressional seats. Presidential popularity has also been linked to presidential 
success in congressional roll call votes,[5] the success of presidential policy initiatives,[6] and 
congressional reactions to presidential vetoes.[7] 
Popular presidents have more leverage in persuading other political actors to adopt 
administration priorities and policies as their own [8] and are more likely to present bold and 
ambitious legislative packages to Congress.[9] Although not binding, Crespi has observed that 
"[p]residential approval ratings have created a pseudo-parliamentary situation, whereby the 
president faces a monthly vote of confidence from the total electorate...this vote of confidence is 
accepted by both politicians and political analysts as an indicator of the president's political clout 
and, therefore, of his ability to govern effectively."[10] Quite simply, presidents enjoying 
substantial popularity and public support have more options and resources available to them and 
fewer concerns about congressional resistance to their policies, while unpopular presidents may 
be more vulnerable to congressional recalcitrance and investigations. 
Presidential popularity is not a constant, however, and every president in the era of modern public 
opinion polling has seen his approval ratings wax and wane, sometimes considerably, for reasons 
that are often unclear. Marra, Ostrom, and Simon[11] note that there are three basic, though not 
mutually exclusive, schools of thought as to the dynamics that influence presidential popularity. 
One school of thought begins with the observation that, for most incumbents, public approval 
"moves ineluctably downward from the first day in office."[12] Advocates of this perspective[13] 
maintain that presidential approval is characterized by a gradual and steady erosion over the 
course of a presidential term, and that while events and developments may temporarily delay or 
even reverse this decline over the short-term, it cannot be forestalled indefinitely.  
A second school of thought emphasizes the domestic and international contexts in which the 
president operates and to which presidential popularity responds. According to this approach, 
residents are continually assessed based on their abilities to satisfy the expectations and desires 
of the electorate. Public approval has been shown to rise and fall in response to such stimuli as 
the rates of unemployment and inflation, levels of international tension, battle deaths during 
periods of war, and the success of the president's legislative agenda.[14]  
The third school of thought accepts this relationship between public approval and environmental 
stimuli, but emphasizes instead the symbolic nature of the presidency and the potential for 
ameliorating the negative impact of events in the domestic and international arenas through 
political drama and effective public relations strategies. Faced with the inevitable loss of such an 
important political asset, presidents might be expected to do whatever is in their power in 
attempting to minimize or even reverse this seemingly inexorable decline in public approval.[15] 
Kernell[16] and Brace and Hinckley[17] even posit the development of a "public relations 
presidency" in the postwar era in which incumbents strategically or reactively "act in deliberate 
ways to achieve heightened popularity in the polls and in elections."[18] Activities such as 
televised addresses, foreign and domestic travel, press conferences, and Rose Garden signings 
are all designed to present a coherent message or theme to the electorate, all with an eye toward 
maximizing and maintaining public approval. 
Diversionary Theory of War 
While the realist school of international relations holds that virtually all international behavior can 
be explained through such exogenous factors as the prevailing level of international tension and 
strategic balance, the diversionary theory of war posits that such internal domestic factors as 
presidential approval, election cycles, and the state of the economy may affect decisions to 
employ force as well. [19]The popular presumption that presidents will turn to military adventurism 
to divert attention from dismal economic conditions, faltering popularity ratings or pending 
electoral misfortune is well represented both historically and in the mainstream media, and owes 
much to the in-group/out-group hypotheses found in the sociological literature.[20] Domestic 
considerations in both London and Buenos Aires undoubtedly played a role in the escalation of 
the Falklands War in 1982,[21] and when the New York Times reported in August 1992 that the 
Bush Administration was considering military action against Iraq in order to bolster the President's 
reelection chances—a charge angrily denied by the White House—the presumption that a 
President might take the nation into battle to secure his own political objectives appeared to be 
widespread. Attempts at corroborating this conventional wisdom initially met with mixed results 
however, and early research found little or no relationship between domestic political or economic 
conditions and instances of foreign conflict.[22]  
Later research however has found evidence to suggest that domestic politics does play some role 
in the foreign policy decisions of national leaders. In recent decades, statistical evidence has 
suggested that presidential uses of force may indeed redound to the benefit of the chief 
executive's public approval ratings.[23] Such benefits may prove transitory, however. Although 
the Reagan and Eisenhower administrations enjoyed significant short-term boosts in public 
support following popular military operations, Presidents Truman and Johnson both saw their 
public approval ratings plummet over the long term as a result of long and unpopular wars. 
George Bush, in perhaps the most telling example of the fickle nature of presidential approval in 
recent years, was denied reelection and turned out of office just eighteen months after registering 
the highest public approval ratings ever measured for an American president following the 
stunning victory by the United States over Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War. Clearly, the decision to use 
force may backfire if the electorate perceives that the commander-in-chief is exercising his 
constitutional authority for political gain. 
On the other hand, scholars such as Arthur Stein have suggested that wars may in fact have a 
disintegrative effect on national cohesion, as families lose friends and relatives in combat, 
consumer goods become scarce, and national resources are redirected toward the war effort.[24] 
More recent research, however, has cast doubt on the efficacy of this "Rally 'Round the Flag" 
effect in explaining variations in presidential popularity.[25] Clearly, the relationship between 
presidential uses of force and presidential popularity is obviously more complex than conventional 
wisdom would have us believe. 
Subsequent research has suggested that presidents may be more likely to consider military force 
when economic conditions are poor. James,[26] Russet,[27] Russett and Barzilai,[28] James and 
Oneal,[29] and Brace and Hinckley[30] corroborate Ostrom and Job's findings[31] that 
deteriorating economic conditions positively affect the likelihood that a chief executive will decide 
to employ military force in a crisis. Because economic conditions are so much more difficult to 
manipulate in the short term, presidents may find the use of military force abroad a more effective 
option for increasing their popularity. Mintz contends that the Bush Administration's decision to 
abandon economic sanctions in favor of military force in order to eject Iraq from Kuwait was due 
in part to worsening economic conditions in the United States in the fall of 1990,[32] while Wang 
found that higher expected values for war and greater costs for backing down during war were 
associated with domestic considerations—poor economic conditions, the proximity of presidential 
elections, the number of seats held by the president's party in Congress—and with more violent 
responses to crises on the part of the United States.[33] On the other hand, Meernik, in focusing 
on 458 presidential opportunities to use force between 1948 and 1988, found that levels of U.S. 
military aid and prior U.S. uses of force had a greater impact on presidential decision-making than 
did such domestic variables as popular approval or economic conditions.[34] 
Conventional wisdom also contends that political leaders should be more favorably disposed 
toward foreign conflict in order to elicit a rally and bolster their public approval when their personal 
popularity is low. Ostrom and Job[35] and James and Oneal,[36] however, find that presidential 
uses of force are in fact more likely when public approval is high, suggesting that relatively high 
levels of popular support are a prerequisite for the use of military force abroad. Similarly, Morgan 
and Bickers reviewed aggressive foreign policy actions on the part of the United States from 1953 
through 1976, and found that the White House is more prone toward such behavior when the 
president is faced with a loss of support among his core partisans rather than from among the 
electorate as a whole, and that lower approval ratings from within the president's own party were 
found to have an impact on the U.S. initiation of militarized disputes.[37] This finding is somewhat 
at odds with those of Lian and Oneal[38], although the latter employed a somewhat different 
variable—U.S. uses of force—as their dependent variable. 
Lindsay, Sayrs, and Steger maintain that presidential decisions to use force in a crisis are 
influenced less by public opinion than by the White House's relationship with Congress,[39] while 
Brands argues that the U.S. interventions in Lebanon, Grenada, and the Dominican Republic 
were facilitated primarily by the lack of congressional opposition to such moves.[40] Taken 
together, these findings suggest that, contrary to popular sentiment, political leaders do not 
routinely resort to force as a means toward bolstering their public approval ratings over the short-
term. 
While past research has suggested that public support for American presidents routinely 
increases in the short-term after uses of force,[41]] this support is often ephemeral and is likely to 
wane should the conflict become long-term.[42] Might presidents time uses of force short of full-
scale war to improve their own electoral prospects or those of their party? James and Oneal 
found that decisions to resort to military force are more common during the third quarters of 
presidential election years,[43] a finding corroborated by Russett, suggesting that chief 
executives might be trying to instigate rallies in order to further their own political and electoral 
interests.[44] Stoll, on the other hand, finds that presidents are actually less likely to resort to 
military force during election years, although uses of force are more likely to occur when the 
United States is involved in an ongoing war,[45] while Gaubatz finds that democratic states in 
general are more likely to become involved in foreign conflicts earlier rather than later in their 
election cycles.[46] DeRouen finds that while the state of the economy plays no direct role in 
presidential decisions to use force, there is a significant relationship between presidential 
popularity and the state of the economy, a nonrecursive relationship between popularity and the 
use of force, and therefore an indirect linkage between the economy, presidential approval and 
uses of force.[47] 
These findings present us with some troubling ethical questions. Ostrom and Job note that "as 
the leader of one of the world's great powers, the President of the United States is charged with 
the responsibility of guiding and implementing policies to protect and advance U.S. interests 
abroad."[48] However, their findings and those of others suggest that presidents from Roosevelt 
through Bush, when acting as commander-in-chief, have been more influenced by partisan 
politics than by the nation's strategic interests. If our leaders are truly motivated to use force not 
for national defense or strategic considerations but primarily in the hope of partisan gain, then the 
moral shortcomings of Watergate, Iran-Contra, and Whitewater must pale in comparison. 
However, if presidents do in fact employ America's armed forces in attempts at arresting declining 
popularity or influencing elections, a program of education for U.S. leaders is sorely needed, 
because recent research indicates that the rally effect is neither certain nor strong. Offsetting this 
small expected benefit is the danger that the use of force for limited, political purposes might lead 
to an extended war, a result which has typically had a strong and uniformly adverse effect on 
presidential popularity.[49] Furthermore, the potential benefit to be accrued from such a political 
use of force is only about half that of a prime time televised foreign policy speech.[50] 
Statistical Analysis 
In order to determine whether presidents in fact pursue militarized interstate disputes as a means 
toward diverting public attention from poor economic conditions, influencing the electoral process, 
or bolstering presidential popularity, this paper will consider whether certain factors—prior 
presidential popularity, the proximity of elections, economic indicators—make presidential uses of 
force more likely. Data were compiled on militarized interstate disputes to which the United States 
was a party, presidential approval prior to the initiation of the use of force, public perceptions of 
business conditions, personal finances, consumer confidence and expectations, and the proximity 
of elections. 
Militarized Interstate Disputes 
Perhaps the most comprehensive data sets on international conflict is the Militarized Interstate 
Dispute (MIDs) data set, a revised version of Gochman and Maoz's original data collection[51] 
compiled by the Correlates of War (COW) Project. The MIDs data encompasses the years 1816-
1992 and provides detailed information on the more than two thousand militarized disputes in 
which one or more states threatened, displayed, or used force against one or more other states 
over the course of this time period; of these disputes, 308 involved the United States. 
The COW project defines a "militarized interstate dispute" as "a set of interactions between or 
among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force or actual uses of 
military force. To be included, these acts must be explicit, nonaccidental, and government 
sanctioned."[52] Given these criteria, relevant cases must involve national political entities that 
are participants in the interstate system—disputes with terrorist groups, separatist movements, or 
other nonstate actors are therefore not included.  
Although the MIDs data set includes 308 militarized interstate disputes involving the United 
States dating back to 1816, modern public opinion polling on presidential approval did not begin 
until the middle of the 1930s, and even then polls were conducted only sporadically. This 
research will therefore focus only on the 193 militarized interstate disputes in which the United 
States was involved between 1933 and 1992, encompassing the Franklin Roosevelt through the 
George Bush administrations. 
Figure 1 indicates that instances of militarized interstate disputes involving the United States are 
not distributed uniformly throughout the period being studied. Most notably, militarized disputes 
prior to 1948 appear to be significantly rarer than those in the post-1948 period. A number of 
potential explanations might account for this phenomenon. The relatively sparse nature of pre-
1948 incidents may be simply a coding artifact, perhaps indicating the difficulties involved in 
identifying militarized disputes through historical records and media sources decades after the 
fact. Given the improved communications technologies that we find later in the study period, it 
may be that relatively minor uses or displays of force that would have been covered in media 
accounts in the latter portions of the study period may have been overlooked in the media 
accounts of the 1930s. Similarly, media attention on the American activities in the Pacific and 
European theaters in World War II might have resulted in the omission of relatively minor 
incidents that would have been covered more thoroughly in more peaceful times. 
Figure 1 
Another potential explanation for the relative scarcity of U.S. militarized disputes prior to 1948 is 
that the United States may simply have had neither the inclination nor the opportunity to become 
involved in such disputes. Indeed, prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that led to the 
U.S. entry into World War II, there were strong isolationist sentiments among both the general 
public and within Congress; such sentiments might have dissuaded U.S. policymakers from 
initiating displays or uses of force during this period for fear of provoking a negative reaction from 
Congress or from the population as a whole. 
Alternately, U.S. policymakers might have been willing to engage in displays or uses of force, yet 
simply not had the opportunities to do so. In their description and discussion of the entire MIDs 
data set, Gochman and Maoz note that militarized disputes involving two or more members of the 
interstate system—not just those involving the United States—have not been evenly distributed 
over the time period of 1816 through 1992. Their analyses of all interstate disputes do indicate a 
marked decrease in militarized interstate disputes in the interwar period, especially during the 
1930s, followed by another marked decrease in the late 1940s and early 1950s.[53] Similarly, 
Gochman and Maoz note that "by far the most disputatious period in terms of the numbers of 
disputes begun and under way has been the nuclear era…"[54] Gochman and Maoz attribute this 
increase in part to the growth in the size of the interstate system, as former colonies in Africa, 
Asia, and the Middle East gained their independence in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Given the fact that the relatively few U.S. militarized interstate disputes in the pre-1948 period 
mirror the generally lower dispute levels globally, it is reasonable to assume that this finding is not 
a data collection artifact and does in fact reflect the generally less disputatious international 
environment the United States faced in the interwar period. Concomitantly, as the United States 
emerged as a world superpower and engaged the Soviet Union in a Cold War in the post-World 
War II era, opportunities for militarized interstate disputes increased, and attitudes toward such 
conflicts among both U.S. elites and the general public likely changed.  
Of the 308 militarized interstate disputes since 1814 in which the United States has been a 
participant, 193 occurred during the period under study, 1933-1992. Figure 2 reflects the 
distribution of MIDs by administration during the study period. As indicated, the Reagan and 
Eisenhower presidencies experienced more militarized interstate disputes, and hence more 
opportunities to enjoy rally effects, than did the other modern presidencies. This disparity is 
obviously due not only to the fact that Eisenhower and Reagan both served two full terms in the 
Oval Office, but also that their presidencies coincided with the relatively more disputatious 
environments of the 1950s and 1980s (refer to Figure 1 above).  
Figure 2: Rally Events per Administration 
 
Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive information on the disputes themselves in which the United 
States was involved between 1933 and 1992. Table 1 is based on data included in the Militarized 
Interstate Disputes data set and reports the highest action reached by the participants in the 
disputes in which the United States was a participant. As indicated, displays of troops, ships, 
planes, or other mobilizations accounted for more than 27 percent of the highest actions in the 
disputes, while border violations and blockades accounted for more than twelve percent. Twenty-
three percent of actions consisted of occupations of territory, seizures, clashes and raids. 
Declarations of war and interstate war account for just over three percent of U.S. responses over 
the study period. 
Table 1: Highest Action in Dispute by Either Party 
 
Table 2: Hostility Level of Dispute 
Table 2 measures the hostility level to which the dispute escalated. The fourteen types of military 
action presented in Table 1 are clustered into three broad categories. Threat to use force entails 
threats to use force, to blockade, to occupy territory, or to declare war. Display of Force includes 
alerts, mobilizations, and shows of force. Use of Force refers to actual blockades, occupations of 
territory, seizures, clashes, declarations of war, war, or other uses of military force.[55] This 
typology is consistent with the coding scheme for events data employed by Leng and Singer[56] 
and by Stoll.[57] During the period in question, disputes in which the United States was a 
participant escalated to an actual use of force in just one-quarter of the cases considered, while 
threats or displays of force accounted for almost fifty percent of the cases. 
Presidential Approval 
For the purposes of this study, presidential approval levels are based on the Gallup 
Organization's measurements of this phenomenon beginning in the Roosevelt administration and 
continuing through the conclusion of the first Bush administration in January 1993. Gallup 
includes the presidential approval data for the Roosevelt and Truman administrations,[58] the 
figures for the Eisenhower through Reagan administrations are found in Edwards and Gallup,[59] 
while the statistics for the Bush administration are compiled in Saad.[60] However, the Gallup 
Organization's measurements of presidential popularity were sporadic during the Roosevelt and 
Truman administrations. During the Roosevelt presidency, Gallup asked only four presidential 
approval questions in 1943 and none in 1944, perhaps out of concern that any evidence of public 
dissatisfaction with the chief executive might hinder the war effort; in fact, the poll of December 
1943 is the last of the Roosevelt presidency. Furthermore, as late as the 1970s the presidential 
approval question was omitted from surveys in the months preceding presidential elections, 
perhaps to avoid influencing the electoral outcome.  
In order to ensure that any rallies associated with presidential uses of force were not 
contaminated or influenced by other contemporaneous events, cases in which the relevant public 
approval ratings were measured more than six weeks prior to or following the interstate dispute 
were omitted. Reliable public approval figures are therefore available for only 167 of the 193 
interstate disputes in which the United States was involved between 1933 and 1993. 
Nevertheless, this sample is still larger than those utilized in most previous research on the rally 
effect. 
The presidential approval data indicate that, on average, commanders-in-chief have been neither 
unusually popular nor unpopular prior to becoming involved in foreign disputes. The mean public 
approval presidents have enjoyed prior to uses of force is 56.54 percent (Table 1), just slightly 
above the average popularity level of 55.75 percent for all Gallup presidential approval polls 
during the entire study period; t-tests indicated a t-value of 1.10 and a two-tailed significance level 
of 0.273, indicating that the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in these scores 
cannot be rejected. This indicates that there is likely no relationship between uses of force and 
prior presidential popularity. This simple test suggests that the popular wisdom that presidents 
are more likely to turn to foreign adventurism when their popularity is either unusually low or 
unusually high is in error.  
On the other hand, as indicated, presidential popularity prior to militarized interstate disputes 
tends to increase as the hostility levels of the disputes in question escalate. On average, 
presidents have tended to enjoy public approval levels more than ten percentage points greater 
when entering into a war than they do when engaging in a display of force (Table 3). These 
findings are consistent with those of Ostrom and Job[61] and James and Oneal,[62] who found 
that presidential uses of force are more likely when public approval is high, suggesting that 
relatively high levels of popular support are a prerequisite for the more serious categories of 
militarized interstate disputes.  
Table 3: Public Approval Prior to Use of Force 
 
As indicated in Figure 3, however, there are wide disparities among presidential administrations 
in public approval levels prior to rally events. Only the Truman and Carter presidencies appear to 
have become involved in militarized interstate disputes when their public approval levels were 
low, while Presidents Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Bush each tended to enjoy fairly 
robust popularity levels prior to uses of force. These findings cast doubt on the efficacy of the 
diversionary theory of war, at least insofar as presidential approval is concerned.  
Figure 3: Average Presidential Approval Prior to Rally Event 
 Economic Conditions 
The state of the economy has long been recognized as an important influence on presidential 
popularity.[63] The economic data in Table 4 are based on components of the University of 
Michigan's Survey Research Center's Index of Consumer Sentiment and the Conference Board's 
Consumer Confidence surveys. The Michigan data were sporadic through the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, but were reported quarterly by the 1960s and monthly by the late 1970s. The 
Conference Board's data, unfortunately, does not begin until 1969. Nevertheless, the variables 
employed, Michigan's consumer expectations of personal finances (PERFIEXP) and consumer 
expectations of business conditions over the next twelve months (BUSCON12), as well as the 
Conference Board's indices of consumer confidence (CCINDEX) and consumer expectations 
(EXPECTS), capture the attitudes of the public and are naturally influenced by public perceptions 
of unemployment and inflation.  
Table 4: Consumer Confidence Levels Prior to Militarized Interstate Disputes  
 
Summary statistics for the consumer confidence data prior to the militarized interstate disputes 
are found in Table 4. As might be expected, all of the consumer confidence variables are 
positively correlated with one another and these correlations are all significant at the 0.01 
confidence level. For the purposes of this research, the most recent consumer sentiment survey 
data prior to the use of force are employed. Cases in which the most recent consumer sentiment 
survey is more than three months prior to the use of force in question are omitted.  
The mean values for Business Conditions - 12 Months (120.42) and Personal Finances Expected 
(121.74) are somewhat higher than the average for the entire 1947-1987 period covered by the 
data (111.94 and 118.96, respectively), and these differences are significant. Comparing the 
means of the Business Conditions - 12 Months data resulted in a t-value of -3.20 and a 2-tailed 
significance level of 0.002, while a comparison of the means of the Personal Finances Expected 
data returned a t-value of -2.24 and a 2-tailed significance level of 0.027. The null hypothesis that 
there is no significant difference in these scores may therefore be safely rejected in these 
instances. 
The mean values for Consumer Confidence (87) and Consumer Expectations (93.87), however, 
are virtually identical to those for the entire 1969-1992 period covered by the Conference Board's 
data (90.77 and 94.41, respectively), and t-tests indicated that the differences were not 
statistically significant. While the findings for Consumer Confidence and Consumer Expectations 
would seem to counter the premise of the diversionary theory that presidents are more inclined to 
turn to military adventurism to divert public attention from the state of the economy, the findings 
for "Business Conditions" and "Personal Finances" suggest that presidents may, 
counterintuitively, be more likely to become involved in uses of force when consumer confidence 
and expectations are relatively high.  
Electoral Calendar 
As noted previously, there is a widespread assumption that presidents might resort to foreign 
military action as a means of influencing impending elections. While some research has 
suggested that presidents are indeed more likely to become involved in uses of force as elections 
approach,[64] others have failed to find such a relationship.[65] In order to assess the relationship 
between uses of force, presidential approval, and the electoral calendar, the variable NEXTELEC 
will represent the months remaining until the next presidential election. 
As indicated in Table 5, the propensity for the president to lead the nation into a militarized 
dispute does not appear to be related to the electoral calendar. When all 193 MIDs cases are 
considered, the average amount of time until the next presidential election is just under two years. 
While there is a positive correlation between the use of force and a presidential election in the 
same quarter—excluding uses of force in December and the latter part of November following an 
election—the relationship is not statistically significant. This suggests once again that presidents 
do not seem to routinely schedule uses of force as a means of influencing impending elections. 
Table 5: Hostility Level and Months until Election 
It may be that presidents who wish to influence impending elections through uses of force would 
only favor certain kinds of military action. Given the potentially disastrous effects a major military 
endeavor might have on a presidency, as evidenced by the Truman and Johnson experiences, a 
chief executive might be more inclined toward threats and displays of force rather than uses of 
force or war in the months preceding elections. However, as indicated in Table 5, there appear to 
be no appreciable differences among the different hostility levels in the amount of time until the 
next election. For each hostility level, the average amount of time until the next presidential 
election is about two years. 
Conclusion 
Conventional wisdom, sociological theory, and past research have often suggested that 
presidents may be inclined to seek out foreign military adventures in order to bolster sagging 
public approval ratings, influence voting behavior prior to elections, or divert attention from 
lackluster economic conditions. Such theories have gained credence in recent decades through 
statistical and anecdotal evidence suggesting that such uses of force may raise the chief 
executive's public approval ratings, although the benefits appear most often to have been minor 
and transitory, in both real and political terms. 
That a president may elicit a surge of patriotism and public approval for his administration and its 
policies through an international crisis is perhaps one of the most deeply held tenets in American 
politics, and for a number of years the anecdotal evidence that such a phenomenon in fact 
existed was supported by the prevailing empirical research.[66] More recent studies, however, 
have cast doubt on the efficacy of the rally effect to accurately account for and explain what 
happens to public opinion and presidential popularity during militarized interstate disputes; while 
public support for the president during international crises does increase in many instances, this 
increase is often small, is by no means certain, and appears to be contingent on a number of 
contextual factors.[67] Clearly the relationship between presidential uses of force and presidential 
popularity is more complex than conventional wisdom would have us believe. 
The diversionary theory of war, the widely held belief that presidents will be predisposed toward 
uses of force in militarized interstate disputes as a means of boosting their own public approval 
ratings, diverting public attention from domestic political or economic troubles, or to influence 
impending elections, assumes, of course, that the rally effect is in fact real, or at least that 
presidents believe that it is. However, key elements of the diversionary theory of war have been 
brought into question as a result of this research. Despite popular presumptions to the contrary, 
presidents are in fact not more likely to become involved in crises when their popularity is low, 
and actually are more likely to enjoy higher than average public approval levels prior to becoming 
involved in militarized disputes. The economic data presented also suggest that presidents are 
not more inclined to seek out foreign military diversions when the consumer confidence in the 
health of the economy is low, but that in fact consumer confidence and expectations tend to be 
higher than average prior to a dispute. Similarly, the proximity of elections does not appear to be 
a factor in the onset of militarized interstate disputes either.  
However, while these results do cast doubt on the proposition that presidents are inclined toward 
international adventurism as a means of bolstering their own political positions, it is possible that 
presidents in political difficulty are in fact simply more selective and discriminating in their choices 
as to what activities they choose to divert public attention. As indicated previously, Russett notes 
that a president may realize a greater boost to his public approval ratings through a nationally 
televised primetime speech without the long-term risks entailed should a limited military dispute 
escalate into war.[68]  
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